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The increasing global reach of companies, accompanied by restructuring activities, lead to a 
greater ability of multinational companies to shift production. Hypermobility of capital is having 
a progressively direct effect on employees, bodies of employee representation and trade unions. 
Globalisation is challenging national systems of industrial relations, weakens labour’s bargaining 
power and encourages a ‘race to the bottom’ in wages, working conditions and management 
practices (Silver, 2003:4). Therefore, a global strategy is a necessary labour response to match 
the reach of global capital (Burgmann, 2016).  
This paper analyses one such response – creation of global worker bodies in multinational 
companies. These bodies of indirect collective employee voice take the form of World Works 
Councils (WWCs), World Union Councils (WUCs) and Global Trade Union networks (GUNs). 
They are still relatively under-researched and present a gap in the academic literature. Based on 
three company case studies in the metalworking sector, this paper evaluates the ability of these 
global worker bodies to provide meaningful employee voice. In doing so, it attempts to provide 
an understanding of their formation, functioning and, most importantly, outcomes for employees.  
This paper begins by providing a brief overview of labour strategies. Following this, it outlines 
the conceptual framework underpinning the study – the regulatory space. It proceeds by 
providing the typology of the global worker bodies with definitions suggested by the author. The 
methodology section, outlining the main characteristics of the three case studies, is then 
introduced. This is followed by a discussion of the key findings, which is divided into three 
sections: formation, functioning and effectiveness of the global worker bodies. When analysing 
effectiveness of the global worker bodies, discussion focuses on five key incidents that took 
place in the three case studies in Czech Republic, USA, India, Turkey and Argentina. 





The view that the increased capital mobility has a negative impact on labour is widely 
recognised and ‘such analysis is now largely taken for granted’ (Wills, 2001:485). However, 
more recently scholars started placing more emphasis on labour movement revitalisation. In 
2003 a special issue of the European Journal of Industrial Relations on labour movement 
revitalisation outlined that changing economic conditions were transforming unions, which 
respond by re-shaping themselves as political actors (Baccaro et al., 2003:128). Gajewska (2009) 
in her book ‘Transnational Labour Solidarity’ demonstrates that the experience of cooperation 
between trade unions in different countries further reinforces international solidarity. The threat 
from the employer, encourages trade unions to re-think their actions and search for new 
solutions. Globalisation urges labour organisations in different countries to form more 
meaningful linkages, while making it necessary for them to do so (Burgmann, 2016). 
There are two key approaches adopted by labour that can be identified. First approach refers to 
the intensification of political lobbying activities in order to establish a social framework at the 
global level. It takes the form of the Global Union Federations’ (GUF) cross-border activities, 
negotiation of the International Framework Agreements (IFAs), adoption and promotion of the 
ILO Core Labour Standards and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Through 
the adoption of IFAs, Global Union Federations (GUFs), employee representatives and 
management attempt to achieve several goals: (a) ensure compliance with the ILO’s Core 
Labour Conventions; (b) recognise the relevant GUF; (c) provide conflict resolution mechanisms 
and (d) achieve international solidarity (Fichter et al., 2011). However, scepticism towards 
effectiveness of IFAs has increased in recent years. Scholars identify the business-friendly nature 
of IFAs (Christopherson and Lillie, 2005; Pries and Seeliger, 2013). Both national and global 
union organisations emphasise the weakness of IFAs and practical issues in implementing them 
(Fichter and McCallum, 2015). 
Second strategy is the creation of worker bodies embracing all sites of the multinational 
company. It involves the creation of company-level bodies: European Works Councils (EWCs) 
at the European level, and Extended European Woks Councils, Global Trade Union Networks 
(GUNs), World Union Councils (WUCs) and the World Works Councils (WWCs) at the global 
level. This paper mainly focuses on the bodies operating at the global level. Several scholars 
have argued that these global worker bodies are well-suited to reinstate global labour solidarity 
(Steiert, 2001; Müller et al., 2006). Bronfenbrenner (2007) argues that the amount of money 
required to bring workers from the different countries together on a regular basis is beyond 
financial resources of national unions and GUFs. Therefore, these worker bodies possess an 
important advantage – they are usually funded by the companies. However, this is a double-
edged sword, as the stability of these bodies largely depends on the management goodwill and 
support. Bronfenbrenner (2007) also argues that since global bodies are multinational based, they 
can segment the labour force. Therefore, she advocates for the creation of bodies, in which the 
GUFs and/or major national unions play a key role. 
The two strategies outlined above are not considered independently from each other. There is a 
growing body of research exploring the relationship between the establishment of global worker 
bodies and negotiation of IFAs (Mustchin and Martinez Lucio, 2017; Bourque et al., 2018). IFAs 
can be viewed as ‘stepping stones’ towards formation of a global worker body (Wilke and 
Schütze, 2008). IFAs are often negotiated together with creation of GUNs, that are established to 
monitor their implementation (Dufour-Poirier and Hennebert, 2015). Although IFAs may 
provide opportunities to ensure workers’ rights, the global worker bodies have the necessary 
financial and organisational resources to take advantage of these opportunities (Mustchin and 
Martinez Lucio, 2017). GUFs can act as experts and consult the employee representatives on the 
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key issues. Therefore, the approaches identified above are complimentary and often 
unintentionally strengthen the regulatory framework (Pries and Seeliger, 2013). Global worker 
bodies do not operate in isolation in the ‘vacuum’. This paper emphasises the importance of 
seeing all the elements of global regulatory space as fitting together as an articulation of levels 
(Waddington, 2011).  
Regulatory Space 
The regulatory space framework was first introduced by Hancher and Moran (1989). They view 
regulatory space as a metaphorical space, occupied by various actors that together act on specific 
issues, such as employee voice. Regulatory space facilitates the study of the dynamics through 
which key actors gain, retain and lose their regulatory positions within a regulatory arena (Black, 
2002). Globalisation has generated a mismatch between the scope of the activities of 
multinational companies, which are increasingly global, and the scope of reach of bodies of 
employee representation and trade unions, which remain largely embedded at national level. This 
mismatch reflects disequilibrium of regulatory positions in terms of available tools of action and 
power, between multinational companies and labour organisations. Dundon et al. (2014) argue 
that the regulatory space for employee voice is voluntarist in its nature and tends to be dominated 
by capital. Therefore, the paper suggests that for employees to have any influence on 
management decision making in multinational companies, the national employee representation 
structures at the local level need to be supplemented by global bodies, which reflect the global 
nature and cross-border activities of the companies (Seifert, 2008).  
Global Worker Bodies 
This paper focuses on creation of bodies of indirect collective employee voice in multinational 
companies. Four types of these global bodies can be distinguished: Extended European Works 
Councils, Global Trade Union Networks (GUNs), World Union Councils (WUCs) and the World 
Works Councils (WWCs). The name ‘global worker bodies’ is adopted to describe the variety of 
these bodies. Table 1 presents the definitions used in this paper.  
Table 1: Typology of global worker bodies (own research). 
Extended European Works 
Council 
Extension of the EWC to include non-European employees 
as observers. Can be based on an agreement with the 
central management (for internal and plenary EWC 
meetings) or on an independent decision of the employee 
representatives (solely for internal meetings). 
Global Trade Union Network 
(GUN) 
Company-based trade union network, usually organised by 
the GUF. Can be unilateral (GUF only) or bilateral (with 
the management). Comprise primarily full-time officers of 
unions with interests in the company, around which the 
network is formed. 




World Union Council (WUC) 
Institutionalised forum, based on a voluntary bilateral 
agreement between employee representatives, management 
and sometimes the relevant GUF. All employee 
representatives are granted full titular status. 
Institutionalised forum, based on a voluntary bilateral 
agreement between employee representatives, management 
and sometimes the relevant GUF. Consists of trade union 
members affiliated to the relevant GUF, who have a full- 
member status. 
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An Extended European Works Council is an extension of the EWC to include non-European 
employee representatives as ‘observers’ (not full members). The process of ‘extension’ of the 
EWC can be based on an informal agreement with central management (for internal and plenary 
EWC meetings) or on an independent decision of the employee representatives (solely for 
internal meetings).  
A Global Trade Union Network (GUN) is a company-specific network of full-time officers of 
unions with interests in the multinational company, around which the network is structured. The 
GUNs resemble the World Company Councils that existed in the 1960s-1970s1. In academic 
literature, there are different names used to describe GUNs. Lévesque and Murray (2010a) call 
them ‘trade union cross-body alliances’, Croucher and Cotton (2009) ‘global company networks’ 
and Helfen and Fichter (2013) ‘transnational union networks’. In practice, there is great variation 
with regard to the level of involvement and recognition from management, the frequency of 
meetings and the strength of relations between the network members. The relevant GUF is 
usually responsible for determining the size and composition of t such a body. Financing can be 
provided by the GUF or by the management and varies in practice depending on the level of the 
involvement of management in such bodies. In the case where management has negotiated the 
creation of the GUN, the company bears the costs of its operation. These GUNs are usually 
established by the International Framework Agreement between the company management and 
the relevant GUF. GUNs can also be established unilaterally by the GUF without any 
management involvement. In this case, the GUN is financed by the GUF. Fairbrother and 
Hammer (2005) argue that the declining power of national trade unions makes creation of GUNs 
one of the key priorities for GUFs, as international union action within a multinational can partly 
compensate for loss of influence at national level (Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). 
Some writers do not distinguish between the World Works Councils and World Union Councils 
(Steiert, 2001; Müller et al, 2006). Indeed, both are formal bodies based on a bilateral agreement 
between employee representatives, management and sometimes the relevant GUF. The 
agreement determines the composition of this institutionalised forum and the management’s 
obligations to cover the costs. Union officials are usually invited as experts to the meetings. The 
main difference between a WUC and a WWC is that the former mainly comprises of union 
members from the local trade unions affiliated to a relevant GUF. As an exception, some unions 
that are not affiliated to the relevant GUF may be allowed to send ‘observers’ to the WUC 
meetings. In a WWC, there is no requirement for the employee representatives to be members of 
a specific union.  
In terms of their goals, global worker bodies focus on informational exchange between employee 
representatives and management, and between employee representatives from different 
countries. IndustriALL Global Union industry director Helmut Lense, when discussing the 
WWC at Bosch, summarised its essence: ‘at this body we aim to improve coordination between 
Bosch workers throughout the global operations. We receive from the corporate management 
important information on the company’s plans and how they will affect workers. And of course, 
it is an important opportunity for us to raise our concerns from around the world with top-level 
management’ (IndustriALL Global, 2016). Croucher and Cotton (2009:69) summarise the key 
goal of the GUNs as ‘to collect and exchange information with the aim of progressing towards 










This paper is based on data gathered for the purpose of a PhD thesis. The methodology is 
qualitative, with a focus on three case studies of large multinational companies in the 
metalworking sector. The three cases are: Swedish-Co, German-Co and French-Co (Table 2). 
The research draws on 29 interviews with employee representatives, managers and trade union 
officials, as well as documentary analysis of EWC Agreements, WWCs and WUCs agreements, 
International Framework Agreements and Codes of Conduct.  
 
Table 2: Case studies. 
 
MNC Swedish-Co German-Co French-Co 
Country of HQ Sweden Germany France 








Global Trade Union 
Federation 
IndustriALL Global Union 
Swedish-Co  
The Swedish-Co is a bearing and seal manufacturing company founded in Sweden. Company’s 
expertise lies in such areas as bearings and units, mechatronics, lubrication systems and services, 
such as technical support. Swedish-Co is one of the largest companies in Sweden and employs 
40,963 employees is 32 countries. 
Swedish-Co has a long history of international meetings of trade union representatives, which 
have been taking place since the mid-1970s. In 1975 at the meeting in the IMF World Swedish-
Co Council was set up. It was organised by the International Metalworkers’ Federation (the 
IMF) with the aim of information exchange. The delegates from Sweden, Germany, Italy and 
France attended the first meeting, but soon the network grew to include non-EU representatives. 
However, the meetings were irregular and took place every two to three years. There were 
language barriers and lack of international contacts.  
To overcome these issues, the company decided to establish a Swedish-Co World Union Council 
by signing an Agreement in 1996. Interestingly, both the WUC and the EWC Agreement were 
signed in 1996 at Swedish-Co. However, there were no separate meetings of the Swedish-Co 
EWC until 2016. The EWC was part of the Swedish-Co WUC set-up. In the 2016 the decision 
has been made to ‘reactivate’ the EWC at Swedish-Co. There is a single Steering Committee at 
Swedish-Co, which consists of five people ex officio: the WUC Chairman, the WUC Vice 
Chairman, secretary, advisor from IF Metall and advisor from the IndustriALL Global.  
The key feature of the Swedish-Co WUC, is that only unions affiliated to IndustriALL Global 
can send delegates to the WUC meetings. If the union leaves the IndustriALL Global, they lose 
their right to send delegates. Some unions that are not affiliated to IndustriALL are permitted to 
send observers to the WUC meetings. However, this is decided by the WUC Chairman on the 
case-by-case basis.  
In 2003 the IFA was signed by the Swedish-Co management, European Metalworkers’ 
Federation and the International Metalworkers’ Federation. It acknowledges the principles 
outlined in the eight ILO’s Core Labour Conventions and health and safety at the workplace. 
However, the IFA was never updated. In 2014 Swedish-Co updated its Code of Conduct and 
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offered the WUC Chairman to sign the section related to employees. By definition this is not a 
typical IFA, which requires to be signed by a relevant GUF. This Code of Conduct is monitored 
by the WUC and the breaches can be discussed in the annual WUC meetings.  
German-Co 
German-Co is a German mechanical engineering conglomerate with its headquarters in Munich. 
German-Co core activities lie in the fields of electrification, automation and digitalisation. The 
multinational employs 293,000 people in 190 countries.  
The World Company Council existed in German-Co in the 1990s and consisted of 100 delegates. 
The World Company Council met only once and stopped functioning after the first meeting. It 
was only after the German-Co IFA was signed in 2012 that global organising initiatives started 
again at German-Co. The German-Co IFA (2012) was signed by the German-Co Central Works 
Council, the IG Metall, the IndustriALL Global and company management and initiated the 
creation of a Global Trade Union Network. 
Based on the geographical location, the German-Co IFA (2012) establishes five regional 
committees that form the German-Co GUN:  
• the Steering Committee of the unions from the US and Canada represented at German-
Co,  
• the German-Co China Trade Union Chairman Community,  
• the Employees’ Federation of German-Co India,  
• the Coordination Committee of German-Co in South America,  
• the German-Co Labour Union South Korea. 
The Central Works Council initiated creation of regional committees in China, South Korea and 
the USA and Canada, while IndustriALL Global set-up committees in India and South America.  
The EWC at German-Co was set up in 1995 under Article 13. German-Co EWC Agreement 
(2015) is the most recent agreement at the time of writing, but the fundamental contents of the 
EWC agreement have never been changed since 1995.  
French-Co 
French-Co is a French automotive company with headquarters near Paris. Company’s expertise 
lies in manufacturing of passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and associated components, as 
well as provisions of such services as sales financing, rental, maintenance and service contracts. 
The multinational employs 179,565 people in 37 countries worldwide. 
The World Works Council at French-Co is a result of a gradual extension of the European Works 
Council. The EWC at French-Co was established in 1993. Major changes came in 2000, when 
the observer status was granted to employee representatives from Argentina, Brazil, Romania, 
Slovenia and Turkey. The agreement also included a clause that the Korean observer could be 
appointed within a period of two years. In this Extended EWC, the non-EU employees were 
given an observer status. In 2003 countries with observer status included Argentina, Brazil, 
Korea, Rumania and Turkey. In 2007 a Russian employee was invited to the meetings as an 
observer. In 2011 an observer from Morocco joined. 
In 2015 the French-Co World Works Council was established when the Addendum to the 
French-Co Group Council was signed by the IndustriALL European Trade Union, IndustriALL 
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Global, management and union representatives from major French-Co facilities in Europe. This 
agreement formalised the creation of a World Works Council.  
There are no separate EWC meetings at French-Co. Although the Agreement permits meetings 
in a ‘EWC configuration’, these have not taken place at French-Co. There are Group Select 
Committee meetings, which consist of a secretary, management representatives and ten deputy 
secretaries. Secretary and deputy secretaries are appointed among the EU members of the WWC.  
There are two most recent IFAs negotiated at the French-Co: the French-Co IFA (2013) and the 
French-Co IFA (2019). Company management, the EWC and IndustriALL Global signed the 
French-Co IFA (2013). This agreement renews and reinforces the old French-Co IFA (2004). In 
2019 management, the French-Co WWC and IndustriALL Global signed the French-Co IFA 
(2019). It complements the existing agreement and incorporates the principles stipulated by the 
ILO in the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190).  
 
Formation 
Since there is no legal framework to guide their creation, there is great variety of ways in which 
global worker bodies may be established. GUNs can either be negotiated by management or 
unilaterally by the GUF. If the GUN is negotiated by management, a company usually signs an 
International Framework Agreement, which establishes the creation of a monitoring body – the 
Global Trade Union Network. The relevant GUF, together with a major national trade union 
and/or a Central Works Council are responsible for the determining the membership, size and 
composition of such network. This is demonstrated by the German-Co case, where GUN was 
created after the IFA was signed. The IFA addressed the creation of regional and national 
committees. In this case, regulatory change was carried out in a negotiated manner. However, the 
creation of regional committees was not a simultaneous process, as it took time to get in contact 
with local trade unions and organise trade union networks in different regions.  
GUNs can also be established unilaterally by the GUF without any management involvement. In 
this case, the GUN is organised and financed by the GUF. This can be demonstrated by Nestlé, 
where the activities of the network are organised by the International Union of Food, 
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF). The 
GUF’s aim is for the GUN to be recognised by management as legitimate representative of 
employee interests at global level.  
There are three main ways of WUC/WWC formation that can be distinguished. The first 
approach is to transform an existing informal body (e.g. GUN created unilaterally by the GUF) 
into a WUC/WWC by formalising the existing practices by signing a WUC/WWC agreement. 
This agreement guides the creation and the main provisions of such body. An example could be 
the Swedish-Co WUC. The IMF World Swedish-Co Council was operating from 1975, but it 
was not based on any formal agreement. A decision was made to create a formal body with 
regular meetings, which was formalised in the Swedish-Co WUC Agreement (1996). This 
demonstrates how an existing informal body was formalised through the ‘renegotiation of 
regulatory space’ (Clarke, 2000:25-26). 
The second approach includes extension of an existing EWC, which is gradually transformed 
into a WUC/WWC. In this case, the EWC is opened up to introduce the non-European members 
into an EWC. The non-European employee representatives usually start with an observer status 
and have no voting power. These global worker bodies ‘in transition’ are called ‘extended 
EWCs’. Gradually, the observers are given full rights, as they become titular members. This is 
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also reflected in the agreement that company signs to formalise the creation of the WUC/WWC. 
This was evident in the French-Co case, where an extended EWC was transformed into a WWC 
in 2015.   
The third approach is the creation of a WUC/WWC from the start rather transforming an existing 
body. In this case a WUC/WWC could either be operating on its own, or in parallel with an 
existing EWC, creating a dual channel of employee voice in the company. In companies with 
dual bodies (the EWC and the global worker body) there is a partial overlap of membership 
between the WUC/WWC and the EWC, which facilitates cooperation (da Costa and Rehfeldt, 
2008). There are a number of examples of the dual bodies operating in multinational companies. 
For example, French telecommunications group Orange in June 2010, signed an agreement on 
the creation of a WWC separate from the EWC. Another example is the case of the Belgian 
chemical group Solvay. At Solvay, the management informally set up the ‘Solvay Global 
Forum’, which consists of four members of the EWC and four trade unionists from Brazil, 
China, Korea and the United States. This body was formalised by an agreement signed in 2017 
between the management and the Global Forum’s secretary.  
 
Functioning  
In terms of operation of global worker bodies, it is possible to identify certain factors that 
constrain their effective functioning. These factors include language barriers, global identity, 
lack of trust between employee representatives, management attitudes and quality of information 
and focus on day-to-day activities of the body.  
Language 
In all three case studies management provides some form of language support. Swedish-Co 
provides interpreting in the annual WUC meetings and EWC meetings. There is also English 
training available to all WUC members. At French-Co, there is interpreting in the annual 
meetings of the WWC. Training in English and French is available to the Steering Committee 
Members, but could also be requested by the WWC members. At German-Co, interpreters are 
available for the GUN meetings and the EWC meetings. However, there is no language training 
available for the GUN members.  
Although interpreting is provided in the official meetings, language barrier can hinder informal 
communication. Research shows that language barriers can separate people and lead to a 
regionalisation of identity, which is a situation when most contacts happen inside regional 
clusters of communication that share the same language (Andersson and Thörnquist, 2007). If 
delegates cannot communicate outside of the official meetings due to language barriers, it could 
limit information exchange, transfer of best practices and establishment of the contacts across 
countries. An example was shared by a Spanish EWC employee representative, who had to 
translate the German-Co IFA (2012) into Spanish for colleagues in South America (later they 
created the Coordination Committee of German-Co in South America), as they were not familiar 
with the IFA and its content. This example demonstrates the importance of informal interaction, 






Even if language barriers are overcome, there are cultural and national differences between the 
delegates, which relate to the issue of multiple identities. This has been discussed in the 
academic literature on EWCs. Huijgen et al. (2007) argue that since EWC delegates have 
different interests, ideologies and diverging attitudes towards role and functioning of the body, 
each employee representative may wear multiple ‘hats’ at any one time (Timming and Veersma, 
2007). This suggests that a culture-based and national identity may be prioritised over common 
European identity (in the case of EWCs). It has been demonstrated that only in rare cases 
employee representatives were able transcend their interests and create common identity 
(Whittall et al., 2009; Bicknell, 2007). It is an exception rather than the rule.  
These challenges to create a European labour identity are compounded when the global labour 
identity is discussed. The competing national interests may inhibit creation of the common 
global identity and development of the global worker body. To foster common identity, frequent 
communication is key (Whittall et al., 2009). Furthermore, informal contacts and open mind for 
cultural differences are important (Huijgen et al., 2007). To achieve this formal training and 
informal learning, which requires active interest and participation from delegates, are helpful to 
foster cultural awareness and better understanding of national differences (Telljohann, 2007).  
With regards to ways of overcoming this, in all three cases companies provide interpretation 
facilities. Interviewees mentioned that they find interpreters helpful, but these are available only 
for the formal meetings, such as the annual meetings of the global set-up, EWC meetings (where 
they are taking place) and Steering Committee meetings. This makes informal contacts, which 
are key for making personal contacts and building relationships, difficult. Furthermore, when 
conducting interviews, it was clear that not all employee representatives could freely speak in 
English. This can be a significant challenge for effective functioning of a global worker body.  
Lack of trust 
Lack of trust between the employee representatives from different countries is another factor that 
can constrain effective functioning of global worker bodies. The lack of trust and solidarity can 
be explained by cultural and national differences between delegates and lack of communication 
due to language barriers, discussed above.  
Competing agendas as well as different roles played by the local representation structures, may 
limit solidarity. For example, in the French-Co case there were some concerns that the human 
resource managers, nominated by management, were sent to the WWC meetings as delegates. At 
German-Co the nature of the GUN’s structure prohibits a closer relationship between the 
regional committees. At the time of writing, there was only one global meeting of all regional 
committees at German-Co that took place in 2018. All other meetings are taking place 
regionally, in which only employee representatives from a particular region or country take part. 
Such an approach hinders cooperation and solidarity between delegates from different 
committees of the GUN, due to lack of internal communication. Lack of trust could be overcome 
with time through informal meetings, cooperation and building networks. Cooperative 
relationships and mutual trust are the result of learning and experience, which very much 




Management attitudes and quality of information 
The quality of information provided by management has a significant impact on global worker 
bodies. Management has favourable attitudes towards global worker bodies and supported their 
creation in all three cases. However, the quality and range of information provided by 
management could be improved in all three companies. This study demonstrates that sometimes 
it is not possible to cover all the topics in the time provided for the meetings. The global 
meetings take place during four days (Swedish-Co), three-four days (French-Co, but could be up 
to a week with the site study visits) and five days (German-Co global meeting) periods, which 
sometimes is not enough to provide, express and share the information on all the topics.  
Another interesting finding is how management may use these global worker bodies to 
communicate company messages concerning corporate values (‘this is the French-Co way’), 
branding and even to facilitate restructuring (restructuring programme in 2020 in the German-Co 
case). In the Swedish-Co case, the company annual report states that the WUC is seen as a great 
competitive advantage for addressing and deploying global initiatives in the company. Managers 
have used these global worker bodies as a potential human resource management instrument in 
order to foster communication with employees and promote company values. Findings show that 
the GUN, the WUC and the WWC are used for cascading information top-down across different 
locations, as well as bottom-up for bringing local issues to the attention of central management.  
Focus on day-to-day operation 
Global worker bodies require a lot of time, personnel and financial resources to ensure their 
operation. Maintaining the global contacts is already a significant task, which requires a lot of 
input from the delegates, chairpersons and union coordinators. It seems likely, at this stage of 
their development, that the focus on the current day-to-day issues militates against the further 
development of global worker bodies, such as extension of membership to invite workers from 
other countries. For example, at Swedish-Co only unions affiliated to IndustriALL Global can 
send delegates to the WUC. Following these procedures closely limits opportunities for all 
unions and all company sites to be represented at the WUC. It also requires a lot of monitoring 
and communication to persuade some unions to be affiliated to IndustriALL Global. In the 
Swedish-Co case, a Malaysian union decided to leave IndustriaALL Global. At the time of data 
collection, the Steering Committee was planning a visit to Malaysia to convince the union to 
keep its affiliation. Another example comes from the Swedish-Co plant in Russian Federation. 
Even though the WUC Chairman knows that the site is unionised there are no contacts. At the 
time when the interviews were conducted, the plant had been operating under Swedish-Co for 
six years, but no contact had been established.  
 
Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of global worker bodies is conceptualized using Oxenbridge and Brown’s 
(2004) ‘robustness’ or ‘shallowness’ of employee voice. ‘Shallow’ forms of employee voice 
provide information and communication and are relatively ineffective. In contrast, ‘robust’ forms 
of employee voice take on a more consultative role, participate in negotiation with the 
management and decision-making at the company. ‘Robustness’ or ‘shallowness’ of employee 
voice is based on key four characteristics: level, form, range and degree of employee voice 
(Marchington et al., 1992:7).  
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Table 3: Level, form, range and degree of employee voice (based on Marchington et al., 1992:7; 
Blyton and Turnbull, 2004:255). 
Level Hierarchical level in a company, at which a body operates.  
Form Direct (individuals or small groups) or indirect (via employee representatives). 
Range A number and types of issues on which employee representatives have a say. It can 
vary from trivial matters at one extreme to strategic decisions such as production, 
investment and restructuring at the other. 
Degree  The extent to which employee representatives can influence decision making. Can 
vary from one-way information provision by management to employee control. 
Global worker bodies operate at the high level in the companies but even high‐level bodies 
might include more than an information exchange, as that company level involvement could lead 
to control over decisions about work organisation (Wilkinson et al., 2010). The GUNs, WUCs 
and the WWCs are indirect forms of employee representation. Due to absence of a labour 
regulation system at the global level, the quantity and quality of information shared depend to a 
large extent on management goodwill. The main topics, on which management reports, vary 
across cases but can be summarised as company structure, economic and financial situation, 
future developments, investment plans, and their potential impact on employment. Overall, the 
tendency is for management to focus on global topics such as company agreements (the IFAs) 
digitalisation, health and safety, and flexible working, while employee representatives tend to 
emphasise their local issues, such as wage conditions, problems with the local management, 
shortage of skilled workforce etc.  
This demonstrates a mismatch between capital, which is global in its reach, and labour, which 
remains to a large extent local. Interviewees (management and union coordinators) commented 
on inability of employee representatives to present their local problems as global issues. 
Language barriers, lack of global identity, lack of trust between the delegates, reliance on 
management goodwill for information provision and the quality of that information, and focus on 
day-to-day activities of the body further constrain their effective operation. 
Degree refers to the extent to which employee representatives share decision-making with the 
management. In conversations with the delegates, it has been mentioned that the global worker 
bodies are not structures to take decisions. Instead, there is an exchange of information between 
the employee representatives and management in all three case studies. There was some hope 
expressed that in the future these bodies may provide consultation rights and allow delegates to 
participate in the decision-making over strategic matters, such as plant closures and 
restructuring.  
To measure the degree of employee voice provided by the global worker bodies, the escalator of 
participation, developed by Marchington et al. (1992:7) has been adopted. The escalator of 
participation has been modified to include one extra stage – ‘no involvement’ (based on Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004:255). The degree can range from no involvement, information (being 
informed by management, i.e. one-way), communication (two-way), consultation, co-





Figure 1: Escalator of participation (based on Marchington et al., 1992:7 and Blyton and 
Turnbull, 2004:255).  
 
As can be seen on Figure 1, global worker bodies in this study are at the communication stage, 
where they facilitate information exchange between employee representatives and management. 
Regarding the outcome for the employees, global worker bodies are relatively ‘shallow’ forms of 
employee voice. They merely provide for communication rather than more robust forms of 
employee voice. In many instances, the employee representatives do not use the opportunities 
available for them to ask questions and engage in a more in-depth discussion with the 
management. However, despite this rather pessimistic conclusion, the study outlined positive 
effects global worker bodies have at the national level. The positive outcomes for employees 
tend to be concentrated in non-EU countries and in countries with less developed national 
employee representation bodies. The five examples below demonstrate this in more detail. 
Swedish-Co Czech Republic 
A manufacturing plant in the Czech Republic has not been unionised and the country was not 
represented on the WUC. The WUC Chairman cooperated with the Czech trade union OS Kovo 
and representatives from management in order to have the workers at the factory unionised. In 
2016 the negotiations were completed a trade union was set up at the Swedish-Co site and a 
collective agreement was negotiated between the management and the national trade union. As 
the outcome of these negotiations, there were a number of important improvements for the 
workers at the factory, such as 6% increase of the base hourly wages for blue collar and 3% for 
white collar workers and a Christmas bonus of minimum 50 %. In addition to this, several other 
important changes included a meal allowance from the first day of employment (before it was 
only after the trial period), a fifth week of vacation, bonus for afternoon shifts and work on 
weekends, as well as compensation for overtime work on weekends. As a result of the 
unionisation of the site, the employee representative from the Czech Republic joined the WUC.  
German-Co the USA 
The first case of an anti-union practices took place at the German-Co plant in Maryland (the 
USA) in 2012. Local management hired a union-busting law firm to help them stop organising 
activities at the plant. This breached the employees’ rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, outlined in the German-Co IFA. The company also removed union 
literature, conducted investigation of union supporters, suspended wage increases, circulated an 
anti-union petition, and denied German-Co employees from the United Steelworkers of America 
(USW) union access to the plant. Following this, the Central Works Council and the IG Metall 
organised a meeting in Houston, which a number of employee representatives from different US 
German-Co sites attended. After that, in 2013 the delegation of US employee representatives 
visited the company headquarters in Germany.  
Another anti-union incident took place in 2014 at the plant in Oregon. The International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) tried to organise the employees but management 
employed a union-busting firm to stop this. This time, however, the local IBEW officials 
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contacted the IG Metall and asked for support. The German union was able to persuade German-
Co management to recognise the union and the IBEW won the recognition election.  
The Steering Committee of the unions from the US and Canada represented at German-Co 
(regional committee of the GUN) was established in 2016 in a meeting held in Florida. Later in 
2016 the IG Metall, the Central Works Council and the US unions have agreed with the 
management to reach a neutrality agreement that guarantees the implementation of the German-
Co International Framework Agreement in the US. In 2016 in Washington, D.C. the neutrality 
agreement was signed.  
German-Co India 
In German-Co India a number of workers’ rights violations took place. It began in 2011, when 
42 workers were recruited as trainees. Their traineeship was supposed to last a year, after which 
they would be offered permanent contracts. However, the management refused to offer these 
workers permanent contracts and gave them a new title – ‘trainee officers’ (for precarious 
workers). Workers were also informed in writing that they could not form or join a trade union. 
Even though workers accepted the new title, 40 workers joined the German-Co Worker Union. 
Members of this union constitute the Employees’ Federation of German-Co India, the GUN 
committee in India. The trade union filed a complaint to the Industrial Court of Thane requesting 
that these workers qualify as ‘workmen’ since they perform the exact same duties as other 
employees. In 2014 a settlement between the company and the union was reached. As a result, 
the workers were relocated to another site and received a range of benefits including: a 19% 
increase in their monthly salary; permanent contracts; five more days of paid leave; bus 
transportation; improved food and healthcare facilities. This, however, was not an isolated case.  
Similar incidents took place in the two other nearby German-Co factories. In both cases the trade 
union filed a complaint to the Industrial Court of Thane and the settlements were reached. These 
incidents demonstrate that the company breached the commitments it made in the International 
Framework Agreement with regards to the workers’ right to freedom of association.  
A more recent incident took place in three German-Co factories in Goa. A number of workers in 
these three factories were categorised as ‘executive technicians’ (similar to the ‘trainee officers’). 
The workers contacted the German-Co Workers’ Union with an intention to join the trade union. 
The trade union contacted the management in the Goa plants and referred to the IFA, which 
stipulates the workers’ right to freedom of association. After the discussion with the union, the 
management agreed to let the workers join the union. In contrast to previous incidents, in this 
case the union did not have to file the complaint in the court. German-Co management 
recognised the union as a social partner based on the IFA signed by German-Co. In March 2021 
a three-year Wage Settlement was signed, which changes the status of 239 ‘executive 
technicians’ to workmen. This also included a wage rise of around 40 %.  
French-Co Turkey 
The conflict took place between the two trade unions in French-Co factory in Turkey. Having 
two competing unions in one plant, neither of which were recognised by the management, led to 
a conflict and workers started a strike in spring 2015. The French-Co plant management agreed 
to organise elections to finally have a social partner that can discuss matters and negotiate with 
the management. However, the conflict escalated, when the management of the plant cancelled 
the union elections a couple of days before they were planned to take place and fired ten 
workers. Despite the attempt from IndustriALL Global to intervene, plant management 
continued to fire workers with more than 60 people losing their jobs and an additional 100 being 
asked to leave with severance packages, which violates the commitments made in the French-Co 
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IFA (2013). The information from both unions and the local management was presented to the 
WWC and was discussed by the delegates. The local management was reminded of the IFA 
commitments and in the end the conflict was resolved locally. 
French-Co Argentina 
In 2015 the demand for cars decreased and the French-Co plant in Argentina was viewed as 
inefficient. The company management contacted the employee representative from Argentina 
suggesting that the plant would close in four-five years, if no actions were taken. The employee 
representative from Argentina in the WWC plenary session talked to his colleagues from other 
countries. In particular, the conversation with the Spanish representatives proved to be helpful. 
In Spain, French-Co had a similar situation a couple of years ago and to solve this matter the 
company had to implement the Competitiveness Agreement in 2010. The Competitiveness 
Agreement could have been the solution for the situation in Argentina, and the employee 
representative was invited to Madrid to talk to the workers. After the visit the Argentinian 
delegate was reassured that the Competitiveness Agreement with the management could work in 
his country. He convinced the workers in the Argentinian plant to agree to sign the 
Competitiveness Agreement with the management. As a result, the plant had a significant 
investment to produce five new car models.   
These examples demonstrate how global worker bodies set minimum standards across all 
company sites (through the IFA monitoring and implementation), support local trade unions with 
unionisation campaigns and improve international cooperation between countries and trade 
unions, which facilitates informal communication and transfer of best practice. Previous research 
also suggests that global worker bodies can develop a more consultative role. For example, the 
WWC at DaimlerChrysler (currently a WWC operates at Daimler after the company has 
separated) was able to block an attempt by the group management to shift production to 
Germany and Brazil after a strike in the South African operations (Wick, 2005). Müller et al. 
(2005) in their study, demonstrate that the WWC at Volkswagen is even more developed than 
the one at DaimlerChrysler. Steiert (2001:125) argues that the Volkswagen WWC marks ‘a 
qualitative step forward’, as in addition to communication provision, the WWC at Volkswagen 
recognises the right to consultation.  
For the global worker bodies to develop into bodies that provide meaningful employee voice, 
they need to develop close mutually supportive relationships with other actors of regulatory 
framework. Indeed, the five examples above demonstrate the importance of such national actors 
as Central Works Council, national unions and the role the chairman of the global worker body 
can play. This echoes previous research. In the case of Volkswagen WWC cooperation with 
German employee representatives and a German-Brazilian seminar facilitated the 
implementation of the Competitiveness Agreement in Brazil (Rüb, 2002). Rüb (2002) argues that 
this agreement was made possible due to high level of personal trust, clear communication and 
support provided by German colleagues. Rüb (2002) emphasises the importance of 
Volkswagen’s tiered system of representation, which consists of the WWC, the EWC and the 
EWC steering committee operating at global and European levels. When looking at the interplay 
of actors in each company case, it is possible to see that global regulatory framework starts to 
emerge. It takes the form of complementary bodies at different levels, which strengthen the 
regulatory frameworks (Pries and Seeliger, 2013).  
However, global worker bodies may dilute EWC rights. At Swedish-Co, the EWC was 
‘reactivated’ in 2016. This regulatory actor – the Swedish-Co EWC is attempting to re-enter the 
regulatory space monopolised by the Swedish-Co WUC. However, although the EWC Directive 
94/45/EC gives more regulatory powers to the EWC than the voluntary WUC, at Swedish-Co the 
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EWC has not yet developed into a strong actor. In the case of French-Co, the WWC Agreement 
specifies that the EWC meeting could be arranged, if there is an exceptional draft decision. 
Instead, the Steering Committee is responsible for ‘European questions’ at French-Co. The 
EWCs in these two companies can be described as ‘symbolic’ using Lecher et al.’s (2001) 
typology, suggesting that they exist only on paper. At Swedish-Co this might be because 
European employee representatives are not accustomed to an in-depth discussion and social 
dialogue with the management, since they are more used to the WUC set-up. At French-Co, it 
seems like the platform for the European social dialogue does not exist anymore, as it was 
transformed into the global worker body. Such tendencies could be dangerous for the European 
workers and their rights. Therefore, this paper argues that the development of worker bodies 




Global worker bodies tend to be relatively ‘shallow’ forms of employee voice. Despite that, three 
case studies discussed in this paper, demonstrate that global worker bodies can have a significant 
impact at the national level. Global worker bodies improve worker standards, resolve worker’s 
rights violations, facilitate best practices transfer and help reach neutrality agreements with the 
management in countries with weaker national representation structures (mainly non-EU 
countries). This is demonstrated with examples from such countries as the US, India, Czech 
Republic, Turkey and Argentina. These examples illustrate how these bodies facilitate social 
dialogue and create points of leverage when company is breaching the commitments made in the 
IFA. However, global worker bodies may dilute EWC rights. This has been evident in the two 
cases: Swedish-Co and French-Co. Therefore, this paper argues that the development of global 
worker bodies should not replace the EWCs and should run in parallel with the expansion of the 
EWCs (Steiert, 2001). 
Capital is global in its reach, while labour remains to a large extent local. To overcome this 
labour needs to revise its global strategy and one of the ways to achieve this could be to create 
global worker bodies in multinational companies. Since the legal framework for labour 
regulation is unlikely at foreseeable future at the global level, labour’s most ‘viable’ method to 
establish a social framework for the global economy is voluntarist regulation through creation of 
the GUNs, WUCs and the WWCs, as well as negotiation of the IFAs. This does not mean that 
the GUFs should abandon their attempts to influence political decision-makers at national, 
European and global levels. On the contrary, it is crucial that GUFs continue their political 
lobbying. Indeed, Royle (2010) explains that since multinational companies are the dominant 
players, their voluntary self-regulation initiatives often reflect their interests rather than those of 
their workforce. However, as outlined by Müller et al. (2006), in the short-run the primary arena 
for creation of bodies and establishing norms through a process of voluntarist regulation are 
multinational companies.  
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